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INTRODUCTION 
This Essay is a thought experiment in international bank failure. It is an old 
problem that has stumped economic policy makers around the world for decades, 
and is the subject of countless coordination efforts, agreements, expert reports, 
and academic works. It has returned to the top of the policy agenda after 2008, as 
financial conglomerates collapsed and entire banking sectors unraveled.
1
 A 
 
* Georgetown Law and Peterson Institute for International Economics. I am grateful to William W. 
Bratton, Erik Gerding, Adam Levitin, Saule Omarova, Adam Posen, Heidi Schooner, Brad Setser, Michele 
Shannon, and Nicolas Veron; to the editors and participants in this TILJ symposium; to workshop 
participants at the American University Washington College of Law and Georgetown Law for helpful 
comments; and to Will Chamberlain for research assistance. 
1. PAUL TUCKER ,  HUTCHINS CENTER ON FISCAL & MONETARY POLICY AT BROOKINGS ,  
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monumental reform effort is underway across national regulatory systems and 
international institutions. It is in its early stages, and success is anyone’s guess. This 
Essay takes a step back to recast the problems of cross-border banking, failure, and 
resolution in the most basic terms. It starts with a stylized bank balance sheet, and 
imagines what would happen if the government presence now implicit in that balance 
sheet were made explicit. The result is Common Capital, a dormant public share in the 
capital of an internationally active bank, which can serve as a burden-sharing key in the 
event of its failure. 
The balance sheet of a modern bank is a policy vehicle and a bundle of 
government commitments. The simplest bank issues money, allocates credit to the 
private sector and the government, and operates the payment system—all at once. 
This combination makes banks prone to failure
2
 and aggravates collateral damage 
from failure.
3
 In response, governments regulate and support banks in multiple ways. 
Like the public policy functions, government commitments permeate the bank 
balance sheet. Central bank liquidity support, deposit insurance, regulatory valuation 
of assets and liabilities, and resolution procedures all represent government 
commitments that shape the way in which a bank does business.  
Other kinds of firms—hospitals, farming cooperatives, nuclear power plants—
might deliver public goods, receive public support, be subject to intrusive regulation, 
or all of the above. Banks are extreme in two ways. First, a bank’s balance sheet is 
its policy work, most plainly visible in the combination of demand deposits (money 
issuance) and long-term loans (credit allocation). A hospital’s financial structure is 
at best indirectly relevant to its impact on public health. Second, the number of 
policy functions and government commitments on a private bank’s balance sheet is 
high compared to just about any other enterprise. Governments direct, value, or 
underwrite virtually every line of the bank balance sheet. In this way, a bank balance 
sheet represents a thick bundle of contingent claims on the government.  
A bank that operates across national borders reflects commitments by different 
governments. For example, a bank chartered in Iceland may rely on Iceland’s deposit 
insurance to backstop its liabilities.
4
 In return, it submits to Icelandic regulations that 
may determine the value of its assets and the adequacy of its capital. But it may also 
take deposits in U.S. dollars from Dutch citizens and lend U.S. dollars to Polish banks 
or the government of Brazil. This bank and its creditors depend on Iceland’s promise 
of insurance, on the availability of U.S. dollars from the Federal Reserve, on Poland’s 
commitment to stand behind its banks, and on Brazil’s promise to repay its debts. This 
 
REGULATORY REFORM, STABILITY, AND CENTRAL BANKING 1 (2014). 
2. See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. 
POL. ECON. 401, 401–04 (1983) (presenting an overview of bank-run underpinnings, including those on 
solvent banks); HEIDI MANDANIS SCHOONER & MICHAEL W. TAYLOR, GLOBAL BANK REGULATION: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 19–27 (2010) (discussing further bank-run and bank-panic underpinnings). 
3. See, e.g., Frederic S. Mishkin, Global Financial Instability: Framework, Events, Issues, 13 J. ECON. 
PERSP., Autumn 1999, at 6–7 (1999) (discussing proliferation of bank failures resulting from runs and their 
impact on the economy). 
4. See, e.g., Case E-16/11, EFTA Surveillance Auth. v. Iceland (Eur. Free Trade Ass’n Ct. 2013),  
available at http://www.eftacourt.int/fileadmin/user_upload/Files/News/2013/16_11_Judgment.pdf 
(discussing the legal ramifications within the European Union (EU) of Iceland’s failure to pay depositors 
during the country’s recent financial crises). 
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hypothetical Icelandic bank represents a bundle of contingent claims on different 
governments. 
Government commitments are not strictly enforceable. When a private obligor 
breaches a contract, a court may compel performance, order compensation, and seize 
its property.
5
 Governments enjoy immunities from suit and more expansive 
immunities from enforcement—even when the underlying obligation is a simple 
promise to pay.
6
 When it comes to regulation, governments have broad leeway to 
change their minds to suit their policy preferences; exceptions are very rare.
7
 
 
Applying this familiar insight to banks recasts them as bundles of unenforceable 
government commitments. For example, in good times, a government might require 
banks to keep minimum capital against risky loans, insure deposit liabilities in failed 
banks up to $100,000, and promise unlimited central-bank credit for solvent banks 
facing depositor panics.
8
 A crisis prompts banks and governments to renegotiate their 
bargain.
9
 When banks run out of capital to cover losses from bad loans, shutting them 
down may have knock-on effects on other banks and the economy. To avoid or delay 
these knock-on effects, the government might pretend that bank assets and capital are 
worth more than they are. In the alternative, the central bank as Lender of Last Resort 
might keep insolvent banks on life support by lending against dubious collateral.
10
 
Governments also can—and do—raise or remove the cap on deposit insurance in 
crisis. In sum, earlier balance-sheet commitments are relaxed, substituted, and traded 
for one-another. 
Banks’ leverage in this renegotiation comes from the spillover effects of their 
failure. The more damage it causes, the more unthinkable it becomes for the 
government; the result is regulatory forbearance and “bailouts” (ad hoc public 
recapitalization). Conversely, the government’s leverage comes from its capacity to 
absorb and mitigate the spillover costs. When the cost of a bailout is lower than the 
cost of a broad-based economic collapse, the government will find it hard to withhold 
 
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 344‒45 (1981). See also Ugo Panizza et al., The 
Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 651, 652–55 (2009) 
(discussing the ability of a court to order a debtor to “hand over assets”). 
6. Panizza et al., supra note 5, at 653–55. 
7. One exception involved an express promise of regulatory forbearance in the U.S. savings and loan 
crisis, made by the U.S. government to encourage healthy institutions to buy distressed ones. See United 
States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 868 (1996) (holding that the U.S. government was contractually 
obligated, pursuant to agreements with federal regulatory agencies, to allow financial institutions to use 
special accounting methods with regard to certain acquisitions). Sometimes, those promises can even be 
enforced. Id. at 892–93. 
8. See Thomas F. Hellmann et al., Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential 
Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 147, 147–48 (2000). 
9. See generally Luc Laeven & Fabian Valencia, Resolution of Banking Crises: The Good, the Bad, 
and the Ugly (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper 10/146, 2010) (discussing liquidity support and 
recapitalization for banks in the context of the financial crisis); Anna Gelpern, Financial Crisis Containment, 
41 CONN. L.R. 1051 (2009). 
10. See Simon Johnson, Sadly, Too Big to Fail Is Not Over, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2013), available at 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/01/sadly-too-big-to-fail-is-not-over/ (examining why the Federal 
Reserve might finance insolvent banks under the guise of liquidity support). 
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a bailout.
11
 The result is moral hazard: banks taking risks and configuring themselves to 
maximize the chances of a bailout from a commitment-challenged government. 
Cross-border banking adds another layer of negotiation to an already complex 
picture. If a purely domestic bank is a bundle of unenforceable government 
commitments, an internationally active bank is a bundle of overlapping 
unenforceable commitments by multiple governments. The government that regulates 
a bank may not be the same as the one that suffers the most collateral damage from 
bank distress; moreover, the second government may have no legal or economic 
capacity to manage the damage, or to mount a bailout.
12
 For example, suppose 
Japanese regulators are worried about their banks’ portfolio of U.S. mortgages,  and 
order Japanese banks to raise more capital. To conserve capital, the Japanese banks 
might cut back on lending in Korea. In this hypothetical scenario, solvent Korean 
banks that borrow from Japanese banks suddenly lose access to credit and, perhaps 
more importantly, to their source of Japanese yen. Unless they find yen funding 
elsewhere, the Korean banks may default on their yen-denominated debts. The 
Korean central bank cannot help because it cannot print yen. To avoid default, Korea 
and its banks must rely on Japan to loosen regulatory demands on the Japanese 
banks, or to supply yen to Korea through alternative channels.
13
 Korea’s economy 
and fiscal resources are at risk if its banks fail.
14
 But the health of Korean banks may 
not be a priority for Japan. With its own banks on the line, Japan might refuse, 
letting Korean taxpayers absorb some of the collateral effects of its regulatory move. 
In a cross-border banking crisis, banks maneuver to get the benefit of the 
deepest public pocket available, while governments maneuver to shift losses onto 
one another.
15
 However, if all the governments got all the banks to internalize the 
costs of their failure, then governments would not need to have a burden-sharing 
negotiation among themselves. This is the Holy Grail of resolution reform today. 
The United States and Europe have renounced taxpayer bailouts of banks and, 
through the Financial Stability Board, have sought to commit everyone else to do the 
same—and to regulate their banks accordingly.
16
 Unless everyone does it, there remains 
the possibility that banks in one country would impose costs on taxpayers in another. 
Successful reform would mean, first, that in good times, all the governments correctly 
value their collective contingent liability from all their banks in crisis; second, that they 
correctly apportion this contingent liability among the different jurisdictions and 
11. Cf. Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 438–39 (2011) (addressing the need 
for bailouts and  observing that ex ante regulation cannot fully address systemic risk). 
12. See generally Jay Lawrence Westbrook, SIFIs and States, 49 TEX. INT’L L.J. 327 (2014). 
13. For example, through direct arrangements between the Bank of Japan and the Bank of Korea. See 
Brad Setser, Where Is My Swap Line? And Will the Diffusion of Financial Power Balkanize the Global 
Response to a Broadening Crisis?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Oct. 18, 2008), http://blogs.cfr.org/ 
setser/2008/10/18/where-is-my-swap-line-and-will-the-diffusion-of-financial-power-balkanize-the-global-
response-to-the-broadening-crises/ (describing inter-governmental arrangements for currency access). 
14. See id. at 162 (“The model suggests that the home country would be left with the decision, 
including the funding, on the recapitalization of a failing bank.”). The failure of Lehman Brothers in 2008 
illustrated that U.K. regulators may be ill disposed to forbear to save a U.S. financial institution, while tthe 
United States sought to avoid using taxpayer funds and central bank lending to bail Lehman out. 
15. See infra Parts III & IV. 
16. FSB, Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions (Oct. 2011), 
[hereinafter FSB, Key Attributes] available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/ 
r_111104cc.pdf. 
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institutions; third, that they all effectively regulate their banks to build up private 
capacity to absorb losses in crisis (for example, through higher capital 
requirements), eliminating contingent liability to the public; and fourth, that they all 
stick by these commitments in crisis, even if their original valuation or allocation 
turns out to be incorrect. In a world of imperfect foresight and unenforceable 
commitments, success would take truly heroic assumptions. 
It is right and sensible for governments to get banks to internalize their costs up 
front,
17
 and minimize the scope for public-private burden-sharing negotiation in crisis. 
But it is virtually inconceivable that governments would succeed in eliminating the need 
to negotiate burden sharing among themselves. As a result, focusing solely on public-
private burden sharing in cross-border resolution in practice means deferring 
government-to-government negotiations until crisis time. 
In this essay, I use the simple bank balance sheet as a device to frame the problem 
of allocating losses from bank failure between banks and governments, and among 
governments. The emerging reform consensus avoids questions of loss distribution 
among governments, so as to boost the credibility of government commitments to “bail 
in” private creditors. Exposing the presence of governments on the balance sheet of a 
failing bank makes distribution choices explicit up front, and harder to avoid. 
I proceed as follows. Part I describes the bank-government relationship. Part 
II highlights challenges in cross-border bank failure and resolution. Part III 
elaborates the balance sheet description of the bank-government relationship. Part 
IV considers implications for cross-border resolution, and introduces the idea of 
Common Capital. 
I. BANKS AND THEIR GOVERNMENTS18  
A. Bank Functions 
Banks have long stood apart from other firms for the mix of public functions they 
perform and for their fragile capital structure.
19
 The bulk of bank funding traditionally 
comes from demand deposits.
20
 Because people and firms can use their 
 
17. See generally TUCKER, supra note 1. 
18. Portions of this part are adapted from Anna Gelpern, Banks, Governments, and Debt Crises, in 
FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, GREAT DECISIONS 49–59 (2011). 
19. See Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a Multisectored Financial Services Industry: An Exploratory 
Essay, 77 WASH. U. L. REV. 319, 329, 335–37 (1999) (discussing the public/private implications of various 
financial services—including depository institutions like banks—and the externalities associated with those 
service institutions); Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Optimal Financial Crises, 53 J. FIN. 1245, 1245‒50 
(1998) (reviewing the fragility of capital structure by cataloging a history of bank runs and the models that 
explain them); Ben S. Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great 
Depression, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 257, 259‒61 (1983) [hereinafter Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the 
Financial Crisis] (discussing the public effects of bank failure); see generally Robert Charles Clark, The 
Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, 86 YALE L.J. 1 (1976) [hereinafter Clark, Soundness of Financial 
Intermediaries]. 
20. See E. Gerald Corrigan, Annual Report Essay: Are Banks Special?, 1982 FED. RES. BANK 
MINNEAPOLIS 5, 7 (1982), available at http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/historical/frbminn/1982_frb_ 
10 GELPERN Pub Proof (Do Not Delete) 23/05/20141:37 PM 
360 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 49:355 
bank deposits to buy and sell goods and services, deposits function as money.
21
 Banks 
use deposit funds to make short, medium, and long-term loans.
22
 By on-lending most 
of their deposits, banks multiply money: the initial deposit turns into deposits at other 
banks, most of which are on-lent, and so on.
23
 Banks also operate national and 
international payment systems. On the asset side, banks’ traditional lending role makes 
them especially important for financing growth and development; it also turns them 
into repositories of valuable information about investment opportunities in the 
economy.
24
 But some of the very things that make banks valuable to the broader 
economy beyond their immediate customers also make them vulnerable. The 
mismatch between banks’ long-term assets (loans) and short-term liabilities (deposits) 
creates the possibility of a run on deposits.
25
 And the very linkages that made banks 
useful for payments and credit allocation can turn deadly, spreading distress across the 
financial system and to the real economy.
26
 
Firms called “banks” do not have a monopoly on all banking functions and 
vulnerabilities. Insurance firms and investment funds intermediate savings, credit-card 
systems and mobile telephones perform payment functions, and nonbank dealers in 
government securities help transmit monetary policy.
27
 Loan securitization and short-
term wholesale funding markets put nonbank firms at the heart of credit intermediation 
and money issuance, creating bank-like risks in unregulated parts of the financial 
system.
28
 In principle, any firm sufficiently big or interconnected with 
 
minneapolis.pdf (discussing demand deposits as “the purest form of transaction account” and the unique 
treatment of transaction accounts by banks). 
21. See HOWELL E. JACKSON & EDWARD L. SYMONS, JR., REGULATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
4 (1999) (“[T]he claim of even the smallest demand deposit accountholder at a commercial bank is, at any 
given time, quickly convertible into a fixed amount of currency or, indeed, usable as money itself.”). 
22. Felicia Omowunmi Olokoyo, Determinants of Commercial Banks’ Lending Behavior in Nigeria, 2 
INT’L J. FIN. RES. 61, 61 (2011). 
23. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF CHI., MODERN MONEY MECHANICS: A WORKBOOK ON BANK 
RESERVES AND DEPOSIT EXPANSION 8 (5th ed. 1992), available at http://www.archive.org/details/ 
Modern_Money_Mechanics 
(The lending banks, however, do not expect to retain the deposits they create through their loan 
operations. Borrowers write checks that probably will be deposited in other banks. As these checks 
move through the collection process, the Federal Reserve Banks debit the reserve accounts of the 
paying banks ... and credit those of the receiving banks.). 
24. See Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis, supra note 19, at 263 
(Banks presumably choose operating procedures that minimize the [cost of credit 
intermediation]. This is done by developing expertise at evaluating potential borrowers; 
establishing long-term relationships with customers; and offering loan conditions that 
encourage potential borrowers to self-select in a favorable way.). 
25. Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 2, at 403–04. 
26. This structural maturity mismatch makes banks prone to deposit runs, where even institutions 
that made perfectly sound loans cannot meet the nervous public’s demand for immediate withdrawals. Id. 
at 404. 
27. Biagio Bossone, What Makes Banks Special? A Study of Banking, Finance, and Economic 
Development 6 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2408, 2000), available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2000/08/26/000094946_00081406502629
/ Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf (“In advanced economies, transaction account facilities are supplied by 
non-depository—and even non-financial—institutions with access to payment clearing and settlement 
systems.”). 
28. See, e.g., ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., SHADOW BANKING (2012), 
available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr458.pdf (stating that nonbank firms help 
fund shadow banking); Morgan Ricks, Regulating Money Creation After the Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 
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the rest of the financial system can threaten the system as a whole. Knock-on effects 
from failures and near-failures at hedge funds, insurance firms, and broker-dealers have 
now prompted governments to treat more and more “systemically important” firms in a 
bank-like fashion.
29
 
There are two reasons to focus on banks as a starting point for thinking about 
cross-border resolution. They combine the largest number of policy functions, the most 
intrusive regulation, and the most generous and varied public support, on a single 
balance sheet. Solving the bank resolution puzzle holds the key to the rest. 
Banks receive two key forms of public support. Since the 1933 Glass-Steagall 
Act in the United States, governments have promised to compensate depositors in 
failed banks.
30
 Such promises are usually limited (for example, to $250,000 per 
person per account category in the United States at this writing)
31
 and usually 
(though not always)
32
 either funded or backstopped with public funds.
33
 Although 
the promise of deposit insurance runs to depositors, it also benefits banks because it 
takes away depositors’ incentive to run. In addition, banks benefit from the public 
promise of emergency liquidity in the event of a panic.
34
 While deposit insurance 
pays off depositors in a dead bank,
35
 emergency liquidity takes the form of loans to 
solvent banks in order to keep them alive.
36
 The loans usually come from the 
central bank, acting as a Lender of Last Resort (LOLR).
37
 In theory, it only lends to 
illiquid firms. In practice, illiquidity and insolvency can be hard to tell apart.  
75, 92 (2011) (discussing the risks firms face); Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson, Causes of the 
Financial Crisis, 21 CRITICAL REV. 195, 197–204 (2009) (discussing the risks investment banks took during 
the financial crisis); GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007 76–78 
(2010) (discussing bank-like functions and vulnerabilities of the repo market). 
29. See, e.g., Ricks, supra note 28, at 122–29 (detailing Dodd-Frank’s orderly liquidation of nonbank 
firms implemented in response to the financial crisis). 
30. Mark W. Olson, Member, Bd. of Governors of the U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the Annual 
Washington Conference of the Institute of International Bankers: Are Banks Still Special? 1 (Mar. 13, 2006), 
available at http://www.bis.org/review/r060322c.pdf. 
31. Your Insured Deposits: FDIC Insurance Coverage Basics, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. [FDIC], 
http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/deposits/insured/basics.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2014). 
32. Particularly when those accounts belong to foreign nationals. See, e.g., Case E-16/11, EFTA 
Surveillance Auth. v. Iceland (Eur. Free Trade Ass’n Ct. 2013), available at http://www.eftacourt. 
int/fileadmin/user_upload/Files/News/2013/16_11_Judgment.pdf (providing an example of where the Iceland 
government made a distinction between domestic deposit accounts and foreign deposit accounts). 
33. See Eric J. Gouvin, Of Hungry Wolves and Horizontal Conflicts: Rethinking the Justifications for 
Bank Holding Company Liability, 3 U. ILL. L. REV. 949, 960 (1999) (acknowledging the “observation that 
the major source of funding for banks comes from the general public”); see also Robert Charles Clark, The 
Regulation of Financial Holding Companies, 92 HARV. L. REV. 787, 814–15 (1979) [hereinafter Clark, 
Regulation of Financial Holding Companies] (“The major reason for the enormous amount of special 
regulation of financial intermediaries, as opposed to nonfinancial business corporations, is to insure their 
soundness, in order that their public suppliers of capital may be protected against the risk of the 
intermediaries’ financial failure.”). 
34. See Peter P. Swire, Bank Insolvency Law Now That It Matters Again, 42 DUKE L.J. 469, 497 (1992) 
(stating “[the] creation of deposit insurance drastically reduced the number of bank failures by reducing the 
likelihood of [bank] runs”). 
35. See When a Bank Fails: Facts for Depositors, Creditors, and Borrowers, FDIC, http://www.fdic. 
gov/consumers/banking/facts/payment.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2013) (explaining how the FDIC resolves a 
closed bank). 
36. See Allan H. Meltzer, Financial Failures and Financial Policies, in REPORT OF THE TECHNICAL 
COMMITTEE, NEW YORK: GLOBAL ACTION INSTITUTE 79, 83 (Tepper Sch. of Bus. ed., 1985) (discussing 
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Deposit insurance and LOLR make bank failure a contingent liability of the 
government.
38
 As with all insurance, public support raises the threat of moral hazard: 
Banks might take excessive risks knowing that if they fail, someone else will pay.
39
 
B. Safety and Soundness 
Solvency (or “safety and soundness”) regulation is traditionally justified by the 
need to protect depositors and public funds, to limit moral hazard from insurance, and 
to cushion the effects of bank failure on the rest of the economy.
40
 A solvency regime 
combines deposit insurance, LOLR,
41
 rules to mitigate risk-taking by insured firms, and 
a special resolution regime to preserve banks’ public functions while safeguarding 
public funds.
42
 Solvency regulation requires firms to keep minimum capital against 
their assets and prohibits activities and affiliations that pose excessive risks and 
potential conflicts.
43
 Since the 1980s, capital adequacy has become the focus of national 
reforms and transnational coordination.
44
 Activity and affiliation restrictions are making 
 
the central bank’s role as Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) in preventing solvent banks from failing). 
37. See Stephen G. Cecchetti & Piti Disyatat, Central Bank Tools and Liquidity Shortages, 16 FED. 
RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV., Aug. 2010, at 29 (2010) (stating that “a vital responsibility of central 
banks in most countries is to perform the role of LOLR”). 
38. See Emil-Maria Claassen, The Lender-of-Last-Resort Function in the Context of National and 
International Financial Crises, 121 REV. WORLD ECON. 217 (1985) (discussing how financial intermediaries 
take greater risks because they know they can rely on a LOLR and deposit insurance). 
39. See Cecchetti & Disyatat, supra note 37, at 29, 37 (discussing the moral-hazard concern that 
extending liquidity assistance could establish precedents that lead to lax risk management); see also Bossone, 
supra note 27, at 36–37 (discussing the tendency for increase in moral hazard of individual banks due to 
deposit insurance). 
40. See generally Clark, Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, supra note 19. To operate an effective 
credit and payments infrastructure, financial institutions must be interconnected. As a result, the failure of 
one institution can spread quickly throughout the financial sector and the broader economy. 
41. In theory, potential distortions from LOLR support are addressed by charging high interest and 
taking good collateral. In practice, these safeguards rarely apply in pure form. Cecchetti & Disyatat, supra 
note 37, at 30. 
42. See TIMOTHY EDMONDS, THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON BANKING: THE VICKERS REPORT 7, 
13 (2013), available at http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN06171 (providing an example of a 
recommended rule to restrict risk taking through capital controls and an example of suggested activity 
restrictions for financial institutions in the United Kingdom); cf. Brady Dennis, Volcker: Derivatives Rule 
Goes Too Far; Banks Shouldn’t Have to Shed Businesses, WASH. POST (May 8, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/07/AR2010050704897.html (noting that 
under the current system taxpayers were forced to bail out large banks). See generally ERKKI LIIKANEN ET 
AL., HIGH-LEVEL EXPERT GROUP ON REFORMING THE STRUCTURE OF THE EU BANKING SECTOR (2012), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/high-level_expert_group/report_en.pdf (assessing 
existing deposit-insurance schemes in Europe and recommendations for the reform of deposit insurance and 
for mandatory activity restrictions on deposit-accepting institutions, including restrictions from derivative 
trading in order to, among other things, counteract); Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Nelson D. Schwartz, Living 
Wills’ for Too-Big-to-Fail Banks Are Released, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/business/living-wills-of-how-to-unwind-big-banks-are-released.html 
(detailing special resolution procedures for large banks in the United States). 
43. See EDMONDS, supra note 42, at 13 (summarizing a report which recommended adjusting capital 
controls as a principal part of the U.K.’s solvency regime, in addition to recommending extended activity 
restrictions on certain financial institutions); LIIKANEN ET AL., supra note 42 (recommending mandatory 
activity restrictions on deposit-accepting institutions, including restrictions from derivative trading). 
44. DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
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a comeback in some post-crisis reforms, but capital remains the dominant mode of 
solvency regulation.
45
 
Regulatory capital is the difference between the value of a bank’s assets and non-
residual liabilities, such as deposits; it represents the bank’s net worth and its cushion 
against losses.
46
 If a bank’s capital falls below the regulatory minimum, the 
government can require it to raise more, to reduce lending, and even to shut down.
47
 
Regulators in most jurisdictions calculate a bank’s capital adequacy ratio (CAR) by 
dividing qualified residual claims, such as common equity, by the sum of the bank’s 
risk-adjusted assets.
48
 This approach dates to the first iteration of the international 
capital accords, promulgated under the auspices of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision in 1988, which introduced both the idea of a shared minimum CAR and 
risk-adjustment for assets.
49
 Risk adjustment distinguishes CAR from another 
solvency metric, the leverage ratio, with capital in the numerator and all assets in the 
denominator at their stated balance-sheet value.
50
 The purpose of risk adjustment is to 
discourage banks from investing disproportionately in risky assets.
51
 Regulation 
determines both what claims on the bank count as capital in the numerator of the 
capital adequacy fraction and the risk-weighting of the assets in the denominator.
52
 
A simplified example illustrates. A bank established in a hypothetical jurisdiction 
is required to have at least 8% of the value of its assets as capital. This means that a 
loan of $100 presumptively requires this bank to hold $8 in capital, unless the loan has 
a regulatory risk weighting of less than 100%. Figure 1 is a stylized bank balance sheet 
before risk adjustment. 
 
REGULATION 36–42 (2008); see also Beth A. Simmons, The International Politics of Harmonization: The 
Case of Capital Market Regulation, 55 INT’L ORG. 589, 602 (2001). 
45. See LIIKANEN ET AL., supra note 42, at 67–73, 83–87 (discussing activity restrictions, size limits, 
structural separation of certain activities, and increased capital requirements). 
46. See Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision [BCBS], International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards, at 3–13 (July 1988) (defining the component parts of regulatory 
capital) [hereinafter BCBS, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards]. 
47. E.g., 12 C.F.R. § 6.1 (2012). 
48. BCBS, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, supra note 46, 
at 8 (“[A] weighted risk ratio in which capital is related to different categories of asset or off-balance-sheet 
exposure, weighted according to broad categories of relative riskiness, is the preferred method for assessing 
the capital adequacy of banks.”); see Ronan O’Connor et al., A Value-At-Risk Calculation of Required 
Reserves for Credit Risk in Corporate Lending Portfolios, 3 N. AM. ACTUARIAL J. 72, 72 (1999) (reviewing 
the BCBS approach). 
49. See BCBS, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards , supra 
note 46, at 2, 8 (defining the capital-adequacy ratio and risk adjustment according to the Basel regime’s 
proposals). 
50. Cf. Council Regulation No. 575/2013 art. 499, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 1, 284 (EU) (explaining how the 
leverage ratio is calculated). 
51. Laurence H. Meyer, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd. of Governors, Why Risk Management Is  
Important for Global Financial Institutions, Address Before the Bank of Thailand Symposium: Risk 
Management of Financial Institutions (Aug. 31, 2000) (available at http://www.bis.org/review/ 
r000904b.pdf?frames=0). 
52. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 167.5 (2012) (defining “core capital”); 12 C.F.R. § 565.2(j) (2012) (defining 
“total risk-based capital”); 12 C.F.R. § 567 App. C (2012) (providing a variety of definitions relevant to risk-
based capital requirements). 
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Figure 1: A Stylized Bank Balance Sheet 
Assets  Liabilities and Capital  
Cash 50 Insured deposits 600 
Loans to private borrowers 550 Uninsured deposits 120 
Credit to own government 100 Other debt 200 
Credit to other governments 100   
Interbank loans (domestic) 100   
Interbank loans (cross-border) 100 Common equity 80 
TOTAL 1000 TOTAL 1000  
Regulatory risk weighting works like this. Assume that in the United States, a 
$100 loan secured by a first mortgage on a primary residence is weighted at 50%. A 
bank that holds such a loan would have to set aside only $4 in regulatory capital, 
instead of the $8 that would be required for a loan to a generic private borrower.  If the 
same loan is made to a U.S. bank, and if loans to U.S. banks have a regulatory 
weighting of 20%, it would require $1.60 in capital. The same requirement would 
apply to a $100 loan to a German bank, if loans to German banks have the same 
regulatory weighting as loans to U.S. banks. A $100 investment in U.S. Treasury 
securities has a zero-risk weighting and requires no capital, as does $100 held in cash 
and $100 in German government securities. Figure 2 illustrates the benefits of risk-
weighting: what was a $100 million bank grew by over 40% without raising a penny 
in new capital. 
10 GELPERN Pub Proof (Do Not Delete) 23/05/20141:37 PM 
2014] COMMON CAPITAL 365 
Figure 2: A Stylized Bank Balance Sheet after Risk-Weighting 
Assets  Liabilities and Capital  
Cash (0)50 Insured deposits 1010 
Loans to private borrowers 960 Uninsured deposits 120 
Credit to own government (0)100 Other debt 200 
Credit to other governments (0)100   
Interbank loans (domestic) (20)100   
Interbank loans (cross-border) (20)100 Common equity 80 
TOTAL 1410 TOTAL 1410  
How do regulators know that 8% is the right capital cushion, how do they 
decide what claims should count as capital, how can they tell that mortgages are half 
as risky as ordinary business loans, and how do they know all government debt is 
risk-free? In-depth answers to these questions have filled many textbooks, research 
papers, and policy reports. But the short version is simple. It is widely 
acknowledged that 8% was a late 1980s political compromise, designed to ensure 
that U.S. and U.K. banks would be considered solvent under the Basel Capital 
Accords, the new internationally-coordinated capital regime.
53
 Although the 
effective minimum requirement has waxed and waned in recent decades, and is 
rising with the third and latest revision of the Basel accords, 8% has become 
entrenched as a solvency benchmark for regulators around the globe. Risk weights 
for private loans are similarly negotiated among governments mindful of their policy 
priorities, especially in sensitive sectors like housing.
54
 Since the second revision of 
the Basel accords, some governments have substituted private credit ratings for 
regulatory risk categories and have allowed large internationally active banks to use 
internal models to measure risk on their balance sheets.
55
 Regulators still have to 
approve the models; they also decide what counts as capital, how much of it is 
enough, and what happens when it falls short.
56
 
Government debt merits a separate look. Bank funding of government budgets is 
an old phenomenon. In one sense, it is an extension of banks’ work as financial 
intermediaries; their ability to pool popular savings makes them an attractive source of 
credit for the government, usually the biggest borrower in the economy. Beyond 
 
53. See Simmons, supra note 44, at 602–04 (stating the origins of the 8% capital-adequacy rule and that 
many countries have adopted it). 
54. BCBS, The Standardised Approach to Credit Risk, at 6 (Jan. 2001) [hereinafter BCBS, The 
Standardised Approach to Credit Risk]. 
55. John Puts, Bank Balance Sheet Optimization Under Basel III 25‒27 (Mar. 2012) (unpublished M.S. 
thesis, Faculty of Sciences of VU University Amsterdam) (on file with editor). 
56. DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, APPROVAL FOR BANKS TO USE INTERNAL RATINGS BASED (IRB) 
APPROACHES TO CALCULATE REGULATORY CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS IN GERMANY 6 (2005). 
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their size,
57
 governments as borrowers present special attractions and risks for banks. 
They have special sources of revenue (taxation); a subset of captive, noncontractual 
creditors (public-service recipients); distinct reputational constraints (including security 
and diplomacy); and—in many cases58—the capacity to print enough money to pay 
their debts. All these can be sources of flexibility and motivation to enhance the 
prospects of repayment—or a source of political pressure that diminishes such 
prospects. Sovereign governments enjoy important immunities from debt 
enforcement, which has led commentators to question the strength of sovereign 
repayment commitments.
59
 On the other hand, governments have considerable control 
over the legal environment in which they operate, including matters critical to debt 
repayment, such as transfer restrictions.
60
 
In addition to these characteristics, most of which follow from their sovereignty, 
governments as regulators create incentives for financial institutions to hold their 
debts. For example, the U.S. Civil War-era National Bank Act linked banks’ ability to 
issue money (national bank notes) to their holdings of U.S. government debt.
61
 More 
recently, the Basel Capital Accords have treated a significant proportion of 
government and government-guaranteed debt as risk-free.
62
 This means that banks are 
not required to set aside any capital to hold government debt, which in turn makes 
lending to the government cheaper than lending to private firms.
63
 The risk-free 
treatment of government debt is not limited to a bank’s own government or to 
governments with sterling credit. Under more recent iterations of the Basel capital-
adequacy standard, governments with less than perfect scores from private credit-
rating agencies retain the option of letting their own regulated institutions treat their 
local-currency debt as risk-free.
64 
 
57. Size is related to liquidity. Government debt is typically more liquid than the debt of its nationals. 
To Strive, to Seek, to Find, and Not to Yield, ECONOMIST (June 30, 2012), http://www.economist.com/ 
node/21557734; Jens Dick-Nielsen et al., Liquidity in Government Versus Covered Bond Markets 3 (Bank 
for Int’l Settlements, BIS Working Paper No. 392, 2012). 
58. However, there are functional limits to the ability to print money. Swaminathan S. Anklesaria Aiyar, 
How to Tackle a Crisis When Governments Can’t Print Money, ECON. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2011), http:// 
articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-08-17/news/29896547_1_print-currency-debt-ceiling-bonds. 
59. See, e.g., NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 248‒52 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(demonstrating Argentina’s reticence to pay out bondholders). For more discussion on the case and 
Argentina’s subsequent refusal to pay, see generally John A.E. Pottow, Mitigating the Problem of Vulture 
Holdout: International Certification Boards for Sovereign-Debt Restructurings, 49 TEX. INT’L L.J. 219 
(2014). 
60. See generally Christopher J. Neely, An Introduction to Capital Controls, FED. RESERVE BANK ST. 
LOUIS: RESERVE, Nov./Dec. 1999. 
61. National Bank Act, Sec. 5159. See, e.g., David M. Gische, The New York City Banks and the 
Development of the National Banking System 1860–1870, 23 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 21, 38–39 (1979). 
62. The Basel I capital-adequacy framework allowed banks to set aside no capital against credit to 
governments and central banks of Member States of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), which includes wealthy states in Europe, North America, and Asia, as well as major 
emerging economies such as Mexico, Korea, and Poland. BCBS, International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards, supra note 48, at 10; List of OECD Member Countries Ratification of 
the Convention on the OECD, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/general/listofoecd membercountries-
ratificationoftheconventionontheoecd.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2014). 
63. See generally Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Capital Standards for Banks: The 
Evolving Basel Accord (2003), 89 FED. RES. BULL. 395 (2003). 
64. BCBS, The Standardised Approach to Credit Risk, supra note 54, at 3. 
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This guideline has particularly interesting implications in the euro zone: because 
the euro is the domestic currency of Greece and Germany alike, the Basel capital-
adequacy framework allowed regulators to treat euro-denominated debts of both 
governments as risk-free despite the different credit quality of the two governments.
65
 
For example, if the hypothetical bank in Figure 2 were German, it would have to set 
aside the same amount of capital to invest in German bonds, which might pay barely 
over 1% in interest, and Greek bonds, which might pay closer to 10%— presumably 
corresponding to a higher likelihood of default.
66
 
Beyond the euro zone, where a government treats its own-currency debt as risk-
free, other governments have the option of adopting this treatment in regulating their 
banks.
67
 This can create diplomatic and supervisory awkwardness, in effect asking 
one sovereign to choose between calling another a bad credit and letting its banks 
engage in regulatory arbitrage. Quite apart from the Basel standards, which become 
binding law only when voluntarily implemented by national authorities,
68
 all 
governments retain ultimate discretion over how domestic regulated institutions treat 
their debts. Financially pressed governments rarely shy away from using this 
discretion. 
Capital adequacy may be the most graphic but is far from the only area of bank 
regulation where government debt gets favorable treatment. Activities restrictions;
69
 
transactions with affiliates;
70
 large-borrower concentration rules;
71
 and even 
famously—the Volcker Rule on proprietary trading, enacted as part of the Dodd-Frank 
Act in the United States,
72
 all permit investments in government debt where other 
categories of assets would be off limits. In many instances, the exemption only applies 
to own-government debt, which prompts diplomatic pressure to let other governments 
partake of the privilege.
73
 
In sum, banks do essential work for the economy as a whole. In return, 
governments provide them with deposit insurance and LOLR. To ensure the continued 
performance of public functions, to protect public funds, and to mitigate 
 
 
65. Council Directive 2006/48, 2006 O.J. (L 177) (EC), Annex VI, pt. 1. 
66. Long Term Interest Rate Statistics for EU Member States, EUR. CENT. BANK (Mar. 12, 2014), 
http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/long/html/index.en.html 
67. Hervé Hannoun, Deputy Gen. Manager, Bank Int’l Settlements, Sovereign Risk in Bank 
Regulation and Supervision: Where Do We Stand?, Address Before Fin. Stability Inst. High-Level 
Meeting 12 (Oct. 26, 2011) (available at http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp111026.pdf) (discussing the ability 
of banks to adopt approaches to risk evaluation that treat government debt as risk-free, despite some 
government debt not meriting such a designation). 
68. See generally BCBS, Report to G20 Leaders on Monitoring Implementation of Basel III Regulatory 
Reforms (Aug. 2013) [hereinafter BCBS, Report to G20 Leaders]; Michael S. Barr & Geoffrey P. Miller, 
Global Administrative Law: The View from Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 15 (2006). 
69. 12 U.S.C. 24 (Seventh). 
70. 12 U.S.C. 371(c). 
71. Hannoun, supra note 67, at 13. 
72. Francesco Guerrera et al., EU Red-Flags ‘Volcker’: Planned U.S. Rule on Banks’ Bets Is Seen as 
Threat to Worsen Debt Crisis, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 27, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001 
424052970204573704577185100193763384.html. 
73. See id. (explaining the European Commission’s planned complaint to the U.S. Treasury Secretary 
about the potential impact of restricting “U.S. banks from making bets with their own capital”). 
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moral hazard, governments regulate banks in an intrusive way, which includes 
minimum capital requirements, affiliation restrictions, and rules to manage risks on the 
asset side of the bank balance sheet. Even so, banks sometimes fail. 
C. Resolution 
Bank insolvency presents a distinct challenge, which has led some jurisdictions 
(notably the United States) to resolve banks under a separate regime quite unlike 
corporate bankruptcy.
74
 Bank failure threatens to disrupt the essential functions 
described earlier and carries potentially significant collateral consequences thanks to 
the fragility and interconnectedness of banks and the financial system. Where a set 
of functions is an essential public good, a set of institutions that performs them 
becomes essential. The only unresolved question is whether any particular institution 
in the set is indispensable. Indeed, the focus of post-crisis reforms across the Group 
of Twenty (G20) has been ensuring the continuity of public functions without 
necessarily insuring particular private institutions.
75
 
Unlike a bankrupt manufacturing firm—which might have a mix of long- and 
short-term liabilities, brick-and-mortar assets, and intangible assets
76—an insolvent 
bank traditionally owes the most to insured depositors,
77
 while nearly all its assets are 
financial contracts (IOUs); both can vanish with a keystroke. Resolution regimes are 
designed to move fast, to minimize disruption in intermediation and other bank 
functions.
78
 For example, in most ordinary cases of bank failure in the United States, 
deposits in a failed bank are moved to a solvent one over the weekend.
79
 Effective 
resolution then requires authority to transfer assets and liabilities, suspend contract 
enforcement, and establish bridge banks and asset-management vehicles.
80
 Regulators 
may require affiliates to provide guarantees for insured depository institutions, which 
are called upon in distress to complement contributions from deposit insurance.
81
 
Because a major part of bank liabilities is insured, the resolution process tends to be 
dominated by deposit-insurance imperatives.
82
 Insured and uninsured depositors in the 
United States, and increasingly in other countries, 
 
74. See BCBS, Report and Recommendations of the Cross-Border Bank Resolution Group, at 8 (Mar. 
2010) [hereinafter BCBS, Cross-Border Bank Resolution Group] (discussing how general bankruptcy law 
did not provide the special powers needed to address systemic bank risks and the creation of a special 
resolution regime with power to address such risks). 
75. See Carl Schwartz, G20 Financial Regulatory Reforms and Australia, RES. BANK OF AUSTL. 
BULL., Sept. 2013, at 78–80 (listing the four key areas of reform, all of which stress the public function of 
financial institutions). 
76. See generally L. E. Terry, Analyzing a Balance Sheet, 3 CHI.–KENT REV. 13 (1924). 
77. Acharya & Richardson, supra note 28, at 198. 
78. See generally Martin Čihák & Erlend Nier, The Need for Special Resolution Regimes for Financial 
Institutions—The Case of the European Union, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 395 (2012). 
79. GILLIAN G.H. GARCIA, IMF, DEPOSIT INSURANCE: ACTUAL AND GOOD PRACTICES 5 (2000). 
80. Fin. Stability Bd. [FSB], Consultative Document: Effective Resolution of Systemically Important 
Financial Institutions—Recommendations and Timelines, at 10, 26, (July 19, 2011) [hereinafter FSB, 
Consultative Document]. 
81. See GARCIA, supra note 79, at 5 (highlighting the importance of deposit insurance given that 
“[t]he effect of failure on real activity should also depend on the manner in which the institution is 
resolved”). 
82. ADAM B. ASHCRAFT, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 176: ARE BANKS REALLY 
SPECIAL? NEW EVIDENCE FROM THE FDIC-INDUCED FAILURE OF HEALTHY BANKS 1 (2003). 
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receive priority in distribution, reflecting the political and macroeconomic importance 
of their claims.
83
 The order of distribution more broadly has been in the policy limelight 
of late, with banks under pressure to “bail-in” non-deposit debt and 
84 
hybrid instruments, turning these into loss-absorptive quasi-capital. 
Put differently, while the bankruptcy of a manufacturing firm primarily effects 
distribution among the debtor and its creditors, bank failure triggers three-way 
burden-sharing among debtors, creditors, and taxpayers against the background of 
potentially severe—even system-wide—spillover effects. It is not hard to see why 
governments might prefer to avoid or defer the day of reckoning, especially when 
failure is systemic. A government may even prefer to recapitalize an insolvent bank 
with public funds, to preserve it as a going concern,
85
 especially when the scale of 
economic disruption and the cost of managing it would dwarf the immediate costs of 
recapitalization. 
II. CROSS-BORDER BANKING AND FAILURE 
Banks’ international operations take two basic forms.
86
 First, a bank can engage 
in transactions with foreign residents, in foreign currency, or with counterparts 
outside the country where it is chartered without setting up shop abroad. For example, 
a bank chartered in Argentina might lend euros to an Argentine psychologist, accept a 
U.S. dollar deposit from an insurance firm in Uruguay, and help a Spanish oil 
company make tax payments to the Argentine government in Argentine pesos. 
Second, a bank can establish an institutional presence in another country. Branch and 
subsidiary are the two most important forms of cross-border institutional expansion.
87
 
A branch is an extension of the original bank in the home country.
88
 It is not 
separately chartered, nor separately capitalized—though host authorities may require 
branches to hold liquid local assets as a condition of operation.
89
 A subsidiary is a 
separately chartered, separately capitalized bank in the 
 
83. Daniel C. Hardy, Bank Resolution Costs, Depositor Preference, and Asset Encumbrance 7‒8 (IMF, 
Working Paper No. 13/172, 2013); Int’l Monetary Fund [IMF], GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 
120–27 (2013) http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2013/02/pdf/text.pdf. 
84. See id. at 25 (posing the question “[i]n what ways would a statutory bail-in of unsecured creditors 
be symmetric to the granting depositors preferred status . . . ?”). 
85. FSB, Consultative Document, supra note 80, at 35; David A. Grigorian & Faezeh Raei, 
Government Involvement in Corporate Debt Restructuring: Case Studies from the Great Recession 10 
(IMF, Working Paper No. 10/260, 2010), available at 
https://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/ r_110719.pdf. 
86. Victor Pontines & Reza Siregar, How Should We Bank with Foreigners? An Empirical Assessment 
of Lending Behavior of International Banks to Six East Asian Countries 4‒5 (Ctr. Applied Macroeconomic 
Analysis, Working Paper 4/2012, 2012). 
87. JONATHAN FIECHTER ET AL., IMF, SUBSIDIARIES OR BRANCHES: DOES ONE SIZE FIT ALL? 3 
(2011). 
88. Id. at 7. 
89. See id. at 5 (“[H]ost countries have the lead responsibility for supervising foreign subsidiaries of 
[international] banking groups.”); see also BCBS, Principles for the Supervision of Banks’ Foreign 
Establishments (The Concordat), (May 1983) [hereinafter BCBS, The Concordat], available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc312.pdf (“[A] branch’s liquidity is frequently controlled directly by the parent 
bank . . . .”). 
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host country, which happens to be owned by another bank (or more likely, a holding 
company) abroad.
90
 
Home and host states share regulatory responsibility for banks that operate 
across national borders, but the extent of that responsibility depends on the form of 
cross-border expansion. With purely transactional expansion, the home authorities 
that charter the bank are responsible for its solvency.
91
 However, authorities in the 
host country where the bank is taking deposits, lending, or processing payments may 
oversee aspects of its business conduct (for example, to protect consumers).
92
 On 
paper, a foreign subsidiary of a bank looks like a bank chartered by the host 
country—which is formally responsible for its solvency.93 However, as a practical 
matter, the subsidiary’s management might take orders from the headquarters in the 
home country. The banking conglomerate as a whole might even be subject to home-
country regulations that conflict with host-country rules or policy priorities. Things 
get still more complicated with branches. They are located abroad but are an integral 
part of a bank chartered and regulated at home. Host regulators may restrict the 
activities of foreign branches (for example, block them from accepting demand 
deposits) and stop or condition entry into their market; however, they do not oversee 
their solvency.
94
 
Adding to the confusion, deposit insurance and LOLR functions do not follow 
neatly from this breakdown. Assume a U.S. bank has established a branch in 
Argentina and takes dollar deposits from Argentine residents. On the one hand, it is 
part of the bank in the United States, subject to U.S. solvency regulation; it has no 
separate capital cushion in Argentina.
95
 On the other hand, the U.S. authorities are 
unlikely to worry about the savings of Argentine depositors—or even about a run on 
a branch in Buenos Aires—nearly as much as they might about U.S. residents’ 
savings and irate crowds outside a bank in New York. In fact, U.S. deposit insurance 
does not cover foreign branches of U.S. banks.
96
 In the example, Argentina would 
have a hard choice: either let its residents’ deposits go uninsured or guarantee a 
branch it cannot regulate. Alternatively, if the U.S. bank forms a subsidiary in 
Argentina, the insurance question becomes more straightforward (it is a local bank, 
after all). However, if the subsidiary has trouble repaying dollar deposits, the  
 
90. FIECHTER ET AL., supra note 87, at 5, 7. 
91. See Lawrence G. Goldberg et al., From Subsidiary to Branch Organization of International Banks: 
New Challenges and Opportunities for Regulators 8 (Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Fin. Insts. at Copenhagen Bus. 
Sch., Working Paper No. 2005–04, 2005) (“When host country activities are performed within subsidiaries[,] 
the home country is responsible for supervision of the consolidated entity . . . .”). 
92. Id. 
93. FIECHTER ET AL., supra note 87, at 7 (“A subsidiary is a separate legal entity, which is licensed and 
supervised by local regulators . . . .”). 
94. BCBS, Cross-Border Bank Resolution Group, supra note 74, at 34. 
95. See, e.g., Peter Coy, The Fed Wants More Protection Against Losses at Foreign Banks’ U.S. Units, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-09-19/the-fed-
wants-bigger-cushions-for-u-dot-s-dot-units-of-deutsche-bank-and-others 
(Many [banks raise] money where it’s cheapest and invest[] it where it earns the highest return. 
So in certain countries, banks can have more liabilities than assets. Regulators allow them a free 
hand on the assumption that if one of their national operations runs into trouble, the home office 
will quickly route it all the funds it needs.). 
96. Press Release, FDIC, FDIC Approves Proposed Rule on the Definition of Insured Deposit at 
Foreign Branches of U.S. Banks (Feb. 12, 2013) (available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/ 
2013/pr13009.html). 
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Central Bank of Argentina can do little to help: it does not print U.S. dollars, has a 
limited stock on hand, and may have trouble procuring more. The authorities might turn 
to the U.S. Federal Reserve, which might (or might not) agree to serve as LOLR either 
through the Argentine central bank or through the U.S. parent.
97 
 
Cross-border bank distress highlights these uncertainties and exposes others. In 
the 1980s, imminent debt default by developing-country governments threatened to 
wipe out the capital of all the largest U.S. banks, which had made the bulk of the 
cross-border loans.
98 
 The banking catastrophe was avoided—and the crisis became 
known as the Third World Debt Crisis—when rich-country governments brokered 
debt roll-overs and exercised regulatory forbearance.
99
 By the time banks built up 
enough capital and reserves to write off some of the debt, First World bank distress 
had been managed, even as Third World government debt stocks went up. 
When the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) failed in 1991, it 
had dozens of branches and subsidiaries around the world arranged in a deliberately 
convoluted corporate structure designed to escape supervision
101—despite the fact that 
bank regulators meeting in Basel had agreed on international standards for supervision 
since the early 1980s.
102
 BCCI bankruptcy proceedings in Luxembourg, one of its two 
home jurisdictions, sought to gather all the bank’s assets for the benefit of all 
creditors; however, the United States ring-fenced BCCI’s U.S. assets until the U.S. 
creditors were paid in full.
103
 Another round of national and international reforms in 
the late 1990s produced more standards—notably the Basel Core Principles on 
Effective Banking Supervision—including a stronger mandate for consolidated 
supervision and home-host coordination.
104
 
The financial crisis that began in 2007 saw the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, 
with its 2,985 legal entities resolved in proceedings spanning fifty countries.
105
 Then 
there was the nationalization of AIG, where U.S. public support paid European banks in 
full on their derivatives contracts;
106
 the failures of banks in Iceland, whose 
97. See, e.g., Setser, supra note 13 (discussing European and Japanese access to the Fed as an indirect 
lender of last resort). 
98. See FDIC, The LDC Debt Crisis, in AN EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING CRISES OF THE 1980S 
AND EARLY 1990S 191, 195 (1997) (highlighting that the “largest portion of Latin American claims 
originated from U.S. banking organizations” and that by 1978 the debt owed by these developing countries 
equaled 208% of capital and reserves on average for the eight largest U.S. banks involved). 
99. Id. at 207–09. 
100. See id. at 208 (quoting L. WILLIAM SEIDMAN, FULL FAITH AND CREDIT 128 (1993)) 
(“[F]orbearance gave the lending banks time to make new arrangements with their debtors and meanwhile 
acquire enough capital so that losses on Latin American loans would not be fatal.”). 
101. Barbara C. Matthews, The Second Banking Directive: Conflicts, Choices, and Long-Term Goals, 
2 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 89, 89 (1992). 
102. RAJ K. BHALA, FOREIGN BANK REGULATION AFTER BCCI 207–08 (1994). 
103. Id. at 162–63. 
104. See, e.g., BCBS, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, at 40 (Sept. 1997) 
[hereinafter BCBS, Core Principles], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs30a.pdf (stating the 
importance of “the implementation of effective consolidated supervision” and the “understandings relating 
to contact and collaboration between home and host country authorities in the supervision of banks’ cross-
border establishments”). 
105. BCBS, Cross-Border Bank Resolution Group, supra note 74, at 14. 
106. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG., AUGUST OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE GLOBAL 
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government refused to compensate U.K. and Dutch depositors while making local 
residents whole;
107
 two rounds of resolution and nationalization of Franco-Belgian 
Dexia, improvised between the two governments;
108
 the mad squabble over depositor 
priorities and distribution fairness in Cyprus, where insured depositors suffered losses 
and capital controls, while the uninsured (mostly foreign) creditors came out ahead;
109
 
and on and on. Like so many that came before, these cases show authorities in different 
jurisdictions using overlapping, mismatched, and often competing resolution regimes, 
while fighting over burden-sharing ad hoc and ex post. 
Post-crisis reform efforts at the G20, the Basel Committee, the Financial 
Stability Board, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
110
 as well as the 
somewhat distinct case of the European banking union,
111
 highlight the importance 
of cross-border resolution on the policy agenda. All these forums and institutions 
have proposed attributes, principles, and practices to improve the process. 
Substantive recommendations include harmonizing national resolution regimes, 
home-host coordination, advance resolution planning, and depositor preference, 
among others.
112
 With the partial exception of the IMF paper, not one of the official 
accounts proposals acknowledges the need for or offers ideas on burden-sharing.
113
 
Instead, the plan seems to be for everyone to improve their regulation and 
resolution, to plan ahead, and talk to one another so taxpayer losses are out of the 
question—or at least minimal. Officials tread gingerly on the delicate questions of 
who provides deposit insurance, LOLR, and recapitalization funds. Memoranda of 
Understanding, entered into by national regulators pursuant to these policy 
statements, are similarly heavy on process (coordination, communication) and 
silent on loss distribution.
114
 Yet, distribution remains the most vexing question in 
cross-border bank failure. 
 
CONTEXT AND INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS OF THE TARP 16 (2010); Meghan Kelly, U.S. Bailout Funds 
Saved European Banks—Without Much Transatlantic Reciprocity, EUR. INST. BLOG (Aug. 2010), 
http://www.europeaninstitute.org/August-2010/us-bailout-funds-saved-european-banks-without-much-
transatlantic-reciprocity.html. 
107. See Excerpts: Iceland’s Oddsson, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 17, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/ 
news/articles/SB122418335729241577 (quoting Iceland’s central bank chief David Oddsson) (“These 
players lent this money to make a profit . . . and they must face the consequences and not innocent citizens . 
. . . [We] are not going to pay the banks’ foreign debts.”). 
108. See BCBS, Cross-Border Bank Resolution Group, supra note 74, at 11–12 (describing two 
measures taken by Belgium and France to jointly guarantee Dexia’s assets and sell off its U.S. subsidiary). 
109. The Cyprus Bail-Out: Unfair, Short-Sighted and Self-Defeating, ECONOMIST (Mar. 16, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2013/03/cyprus-bail-out. 
110. See generally BCBS, Cross-Border Bank Resolution Group, supra note 74; IMF, Resolution of 
Cross-Border Banks—A Proposed Framework for Enhanced Coordination (June 11, 2010) [hereinafter 
IMF, Resolution of Cross-Border Banks]; FSB, Key Attributes, supra note 16; FSB, Thematic Review on 
Resolution Regimes: Peer Review Report (April 2013), available at https://www.financial 
stabilityboard.org/publications/r_130411a.pdf. 
111. See Yves Mersch, Member of the Exec. Bd., Eur. Cent. Bank, The Single Market and Banking 
Union, Address Before the European Alpbach Forum (Aug. 29, 2013) (available at http://www. 
ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2013/html/sp130829.en.html) (discussing the role the European Banking 
Union can play in “encouraging greater cross-border banking integration”). 
112. See, e.g., BCBS, Cross-Border Bank Resolution Group, supra note 74, at 22–43 (providing 
“recommendations to address the challenges arising in the resolution of a cross-border bank”). 
113. See IMF, Resolution of Cross-Border Banks, supra note 110, at 4 (mentioning burden-sharing, 
although with insignificant detail). 
114. Compare FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. & BANK OF ENG., RESOLVING GLOBALLY ACTIVE, 
SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (2012), available at http://www.fdic. 
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III. GOVERNMENT COMMITMENTS 
It is time to return to the bank balance sheet introduced in Part I and the idea that 
it represents a bundle of government commitments. What follows is a summary 
overview of the idea as it applies to cross-border banking, in search of clues to the 
resolution puzzle. 
Like Figure 2 in Part I, Figure 3 shows a very simple bank in a hypothetical 
country. Its funding comes from a mix of insured and uninsured deposits, as well as 
bonds issued in the global capital markets. It lends most of these funds to pr ivate 
firms and individuals, as well as other banks at home and abroad. It also invests in 
the bonds of its own government and those of another. Assuming that the 
hypothetical country is neither Japan nor a member of the euro zone, Figure 3 also 
specifies that some of the bank’s borrowing and lending is in foreign currencies 
(euro and yen). In the case of foreign bonds and euro deposits, the transactions also 
involve foreign residents. 
gov/about/srac/2012/gsifi.pdf with Memorandum of Understanding Concurring Consultation, Cooperation 
and the Exchange of Information Related to the Resolution of Insured Depository Institutions with Cross 
Border Operations in the United States and the United Kingdom (June 25, 2008) (on file with the author). 
See also, Charles Goodhart & Dirk Schoenmaker, Fiscal Burden Sharing in Cross-Border Banking Crises, 
INT’L J. CENT. BANKING, Mar. 2009, at 141, 160–61 
(We believe that memoranda of understanding . . . will not be sufficient . . . . A legal basis . . . can 
be readily provided within the EU . . . . Clear and hard-edged ex ante rules are also helpful during 
a crisis, when speed of decision making is crucial. By contrast, ex post principles on burden 
sharing leave themselves open to interpretation, delaying the decision-making process.). 
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Figure 3: A Stylized Bank Balance Sheet, Risk-Adjusted (Reprise) 
Assets  Liabilities and Capital  
Cash (0)50 Insured deposits 510 
Loans to private borrowers 100 Insured foreign deposits 500 
(EUR)  (EUR)  
Loans to private borrowers 860 Uninsured deposits 120 
Credit to own government (0)100 Foreign bonds (JPY) 200 
Credit to other governments (0)100   
Interbank loans (domestic) (20)100   
Interbank loans (cross-border) (20)100 Common equity 80 
TOTAL 1410 TOTAL 1410  
Now consider the assumptions behind each line item. On the asset side, cash in 
local currency is worth 50 for as long as it maintains its purchasing power and 
perhaps its value in relation to other currencies. By regulation, it requires no capital 
set-aside; hence the value of zero for risk-adjusted CAR purposes. The euro-
denominated loans to private borrowers may have a face value of 100—or a market 
value of 100—we do not know. We do know that they are booked at 100 by 
regulation, which also includes 100% of this value in the risk-adjusted CAR 
calculation. The same goes for 860 in local currency loans to private borrowers. 
Domestic and foreign government bonds require no capital set-aside (zero risk 
weight). Loans to domestic and foreign banks have a 20% risk weight. 
On the liability side, both local currency and euro deposits are insured, without 
regard to the residence of the depositor. In this hypothetical (and in most 
jurisdictions),
115
 the government is either formally or implicitly understood to back 
the insurance scheme with budget resources. Uninsured deposits get no promise of 
public money, but they do get the promise of distribution priority in liquidation 
alongside the insured depositors.
116
 The yen bonds on the balance sheet also get a 
spot in the distribution queue, but they are behind the depositors and therefore at a 
 
 
115. See Luc Laeven, International Evidence on the Value of Deposit Insurance, 42 Q. REV. ECON. & 
FIN. 721, 721–22 (2002) (“Recently, many countries have implemented deposit insurance schemes and many 
more countries are planning to implement deposit insurance . . . . When countries elect not to introduce 
explicit deposit insurance, insurance is implicit.”). 
116. Statutory priorities exist in corporate and personal bankruptcy as well, but they are a tiny portion 
of all claims. More and more bank resolution regimes give statutory priority to deposits, which form a large 
part of bank liabilities. See Daniel C. Hardy, Bank Resolution Costs, Depositor Preference, and Asset 
Encumbrance 7–9 (IMF, Working Paper No. 13/172, 2013), available at http://www.imf. 
org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13172.pdf (outlining different countries’ approaches to establishing 
depositor preference by law); Niall Lenihan, Assistant. Gen. Counsel, Eur. Cent. Bank, Claims of Depositors, 
Subordinated Creditors, Senior Creditors and Central Banks in Bank Resolutions, Speech at the AEDBF 
Conference in Athens (Oct. 5–6, 2012) (available at http://www.aedbf.eu/fileadmin/ 
eu/pictures/news/2012/athens/presentations/LENIHAN.pdf) (explaining the need for a depositor preference 
regime that stems from the majority of liabilities of U.S. banks comprising of deposits). 
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high risk of suffering losses (or being bailed in) when the bank is resolved.
117
 Capital 
is at the bottom of the distribution waterfall, the first to take losses and the last to 
collect. 
The amount and form of capital in a solvency-regulated bank is determined by 
law as a fraction of the bank’s risk-adjusted assets.
118
 For example, our simple bank 
has all its capital in the form of common equity. Some regulators might permit the 
bank to hold part of its regulatory capital in preferred stock and even subordinated 
debt. 
In all, each item and number on the balance sheet of our hypothetical bank is 
a function of one or more government commitments. Almost all these 
commitments fit into two broad categories: commitments to pay, such as 
insurance, and commitments to regulate, as in the level of capital and the value of 
assets.
119
 Some line items comprise two or more government commitments. For 
example, public debt reflects both a payment commitment and a regulatory value. 
Figure 4 illustrates. 
 
117. See Lenihan, supra note 116 
(The relationship between a depositor preference rule and a bail-in regime also needs to be 
carefully considered. If the claims of senior, unsecured creditors can be written down under a 
bail-in regime, and senior, unsecured creditors rank behind depositors in insolvency, this will 
obviously make senior bank bonds less attractive.). 
118. O’Connor et al., supra note 48, at 73 (“Current regulatory requirements for lending banks stipulate 
capital adequacy (asset excess) of 8% of risk-weighted assets . . . .”). 
119. Cash stands out because it is a distinct sort of promise—a promise of purchasing power—that 
depends on government policy, but that is not unique to banks. Everyone who holds the local currency 
receives the same promise. Moreover, the purchasing-power promise is embedded in every item on the bank 
balance sheet that is denominated in the local currency. See Stephanie Bell, The Role of the State and the 
Hierarchy of Money, 25 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 149, 161 (2001) (“The general acceptability of both state and 
bank money derives from their usefulness in settling tax and other liabilities to the state. This makes them 
the ‘decisive’ money of the hierarchy and enables them to circulate widely as means of payment and media 
of exchange.”). 
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Figure 4: A Stylized Bank Balance Sheet as a Bundle of Commitments 
Assets  Liabilities and Capital  
Purchasing Power (0)50 Insurance 510 
Regulatory Value* 100 Insurance* 500 
Regulatory Value 860 Priority (Depositor 120 
  Preference)  
Repayment, Regulatory (0)100 Priority* (Bail-in) 200 
Value    
Repayment,* Regulatory (0)100   
Value    
Regulatory Value, (20)100   
Insurance    
Regulatory Value, (20)100 Regulatory Value 80 
Insurance*    
TOTAL 1410 TOTAL 1410  
Because the bank is engaged in cross-border transactions, some of the 
commitments on its balance sheet (for example, domestic and foreign government 
debt) are made by different governments. However, not all cross-border 
transactions—marked with an asterisk (*)—represent an express commitment of a 
foreign government. At least in theory, the chartering government backs all the 
insured deposits in Figures 3 and 4, even though some of them are denominated in 
euro and placed by foreign residents. 
Things are more complicated in practice. To understand why, one last balance 
sheet is in order. 
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Figure 5: A Bundle of Commitments, Read Between the Lines 
Assets  Liabilities and Capital  
Purchasing Power (0)50 Insurance 510 
Regulatory Value* 100 Insurance* 500 
Regulatory Value 860 Priority (Depositor 120 
  Preference)  
Repayment, Regulatory (0)100 Priority* (Bail-in) 200 
Value    
Repayment,* Regulatory (0)100 LOLR ? 
Value    
Regulatory Value, (20)100 Public Recapitalization ? 
Insurance    
Regulatory Value, (20)100 Regulatory Value 80 
Insurance*    
TOTAL 1410 TOTAL 1410  
The two shaded lines represent contingent government support or two more 
commitments to pay amounts as yet unknown. The first, LOLR, is an express 
commitment of liquidity support for a solvent bank, extended against high-quality 
collateral.
120
 Should the depositors try to withdraw more cash than our bank has on 
hand, the LOLR might replace some of the loans on the asset side of the balance 
sheet with cash or super-safe and liquid government securities.
121
 The LOLR would 
then replace the vanished depositors as a claimant on the liability side of the bank 
balance sheet.
122
 The second, public recapitalization, almost never takes the form of 
an express commitment—quite the opposite, it has been vigorously disavowed in the 
aftermath of the crisis. However, the fact that every modern-day banking crisis has 
seen governments injecting public capital in private financial institutions makes it 
prudent to reflect the public capital contingency on the bank balance sheet.
123
 When 
governments recapitalize banks, they may inject cash, or more likely their own 
bonds, on the asset side of the bank balance sheet, and take a claim (for example,  
 
120. See Cecchetti & Disyatat, supra note 37, at 29–30 (describing LOLRs practice). 
121. See id. at 32–33 (describing ways in which central banks, as the LOLR, may influence the 
availability of liquidity in the financial system). 
122. Note that neither the LOLR nor the insurance promise is entirely credible when it comes to euro-
denominated deposits and yen-denominated loans: the hypothetical country’s central bank cannot issue either 
of these currencies. However, it might be able to procure them in the market, or from the European Central 
Bank, or from the Bank of Japan. 
123. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Stress Testing Banks: 
What Have We Learned?, Address at the Maintaining Financial Stability: Holding a Tiger by the Tail 
Financial Markets Conference (Apr. 8, 2013) [hereinafter Bernanke, Stress Testing Banks] (available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20130408a.htm) (discussing the steps the U.S. 
government took during the 2008 financial crisis, including capital injection). 
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preferred stock) on the liabilities side.
124
 Both the LOLR and the recapitalization 
commitments are made by the chartering government, just like the deposit insurance 
commitment. 
Unfortunately for the hypothetical bank, none of the government commitments 
on its balance sheet are enforceable in the traditional legal sense. Because 
governments are sovereign, they can change their minds quite freely about 
regulation, and can even walk away from their debts with limited consequences.
125
 
As noted earlier, British and Dutch depositors in Icelandic banks learned about this 
problem the hard way in the fall of 2008 when Iceland refused to stand by its banks’ 
foreign deposit obligations.
126
 On the bright side, the foreign depositors’ own 
governments, which had no formal obligation to insure them, compensated them in 
Iceland’s stead.
127
 
The government’s inability to commit to regulate tightly or loosely, to insure or 
not to insure, to bail out or not to bail out, sets off a perennial bargaining cycle 
where the largest banks use alternative means to extract regulatory benefits and 
transfers from the government—while the government tries to extract benefits from 
the banks yet preserve discretion with respect to regulation and transfers. For 
example, knowing that the government’s insurance, LOLR, and recapitalization 
commitments are not strictly enforceable, a big bank might configure itself so as to 
maximize the collateral damage from its failure. Failure becomes unthinkable, and a 
transfer becomes more likely.
128
 Bribing or otherwise “capturing” regulators is 
another way to extract regulatory benefits and ex-post bailouts.
129
 The government 
itself need not be innocent: because it cannot and need not commit to a given level 
of regulation, it may be tempted to repress the financial sector to extract public-
policy and private benefits on nonmarket terms.
130
 This is one of the explanations 
for the favorable regulatory treatment of government debt on bank balance sheets.  
 
124. See Cecchetti & Disyatat, supra note 37, at 34 (“Because of the moral hazard implications, 
officials are tremendously hesitant to grant such loans. When they do, they not only charge high rates of 
interest to mitigate taxpayer exposure but have the ability to write down shareholder equity as well as 
replace management.”). 
125. See Excerpts: Iceland’s Oddsson, supra note 107 (discussing the Icelandic government’s ability 
to decline to pay off an Icelandic bank’s foreign debts). 
126. Stephanie Bodoni & Omar R. Valdimarsson, Iceland Wins Court Case Over Dutch, U.K. Icesave 
Compensation, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-01 
28/iceland-wins-court-case-over-dutch-u-dot-k-dot-icesave-compensation. 
127. UK Lenders Compensate for Iceland’s Losses, NEWS.COM.AU (Sept. 1, 2013), http:// 
www.news.com.au/world/breaking-news/uk-lenders-compensate-for-iceland-losses/story-e6frfkui-
12267084 12029; Iceland Asks for More Time to Repay Icesave Cash, DUTCH NEWS (Oct. 1 2013), http:// 
www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2013/10/iceland_asks_for_more_time_to.php. 
128. See Richard M. Salsman, Bankruptcies, Bail-Outs & Bail-Ins: The Good, Bad & Ugly of Bank 
Failure Resolution, FORBES (May 1, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardsalsman/2013/05/01/ 
bankruptcy-bail-ins-bail-outs-the-good-bad-ugly-of-bank-failure-resolution/ (discussing factors that lead to 
bank failure and the reasons why transfers are likely in order to avoid bank failure). 
129. Daniel Carpenter & David Moss, Introduction to PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL 
INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 21–22 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2014). 
130. See, e.g., Nouriel Roubini & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, A Growth Model of Inflation, Tax Evasion, 
and Financial Repression 2 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4062, 1992) (discussing 
various views on repression of financial institutions in connection with economic optimization). 
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The government’s inability to make binding commitments to abide by the 
promises that make up bank balance sheets has another interesting consequence: it 
makes the commitments more fungible. A government that cannot or will not make a 
budget transfer to bail out a bank can substitute liquidity support or regulatory 
forbearance instead. This flexibility to substitute fiscally or politically plausible 
commitments for ones that are neither can be a useful tool in crisis. For example, most 
governments facing a financial crisis go to great lengths to frame it as a liquidity 
problem
131
 to avoid using taxpayer funds and the concomitant need for legislative 
approval.
132
 
The bank-government relationship as it works today is not subject to either 
market or democratic discipline, and is prone to distortions and externalities. The 
simplest solution would be either to nationalize banking entirely or to remove all 
guarantees and regulation, ending the bank-government codependence mediated 
through the bank balance sheet. Neither is in the cards. By way of modest 
improvement, it is at least plausible to make public presence on the bank balance 
sheets more explicit with a new category of contingent public capital. I suggest that 
exposing the extent to which banks depend on government commitments at all 
times, not just in crisis, and framing the connection in ownership terms can both 
help improve market discipline and force a more open political debate about 
distribution. 
Because it confronts burden-sharing head-on, contingent public capital is also an 
attractive response to the distribution challenge in cross-border banking. However, it 
poses a formidable design challenge. 
IV. COMMON CAPITAL: A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT 
Imagine an Icelandic bank that takes insured deposits and makes small-business 
loans in Iceland, takes insured and uninsured deposits, finances municipalities in 
France, lends to consumers in Hungary, and underwrites bond insurance in the United 
States.
133
 Assume (unrealistically) that all this activity is carried out through a single 
institution, using a single consolidated balance sheet. Icelandic and French deposits 
represent about half of its funding; most of the rest comes from the global capital 
markets. Now suppose that the U.S. bond-insurance business has imploded in a 
financial crisis and threatens the entire bank with insolvency. In a last-ditch attempt to 
survive, the bank is pulling back all the loans it can from Hungarian consumers, 
French municipalities, and Icelandic dentists. Wholesale deposits in France are 
beginning to run. If the bank fails, it will be unable to pay deposits and will likely 
default on its U.S. bond-insurance commitments as well as its capital- 
131. Johnson, supra note 10. 
132. Laeven & Valencia, supra note 9, at 16. 
133. This scenario is very loosely based on a combination of crises in Iceland and Eastern Europe, as 
well as the failure of Dexia. See generally Case E-16/11, EFTA Surveillance Auth. v. Iceland, (Eur. Free Trade 
Ass’n Ct. 2013), available at http://www.eftacourt.int/fileadmin/user_upload/Files/News/2013/16_11_ 
Judgment.pdf; BCBS, Cross-Border Bank Resolution Group, supra note 74, at 1–3; EUR. BANK FOR 
RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., VIENNA INITIATIVE—MOVING TO A NEW PHASE (2012). 
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markets obligations. Separately, Iceland will be on the hook for retail deposit 
insurance. 
Iceland, France, Hungary, and the United States each has an interest in the 
continuity of the bank’s functions in its jurisdiction. If the bank were to fail, each 
wants to minimize the collateral damage in its jurisdiction, including its own taxpayer 
liability. In today’s world, it is Iceland’s show: it can forbear and supply liquidity; 
direct the bank to raise private capital and/or reduce lending; shut it down and pay 
deposit insurance; or recapitalize it, perhaps on condition that it keep lending to the 
Icelandic dentists.
134
 
Iceland’s rescue of a domestic financial institution can operate as a transfer to 
banks in other jurisdictions—or to other governments.135 For budget and political 
reasons, Iceland might structure bank resolution to prefer its own residents over all 
other creditors, even refusing to honor the deposit guarantee when the French come to 
call. The French authorities are worried about their own depositors, about the credit 
crunch facing their municipalities, and about being blamed for their residents’ losses 
in Iceland. France might put its own budget resources on the line, compensating 
depositors and replacing credit lines. On the other hand, France might apply 
diplomatic pressure to get Iceland to keep the bank alive or at least to pay the 
promised deposit insurance. Similarly, if Iceland represents a significant portion of 
consumer credit in Hungary and municipal-bond market function in the United States, 
the two governments have a choice of putting their own resources on the line or 
pressuring Iceland to perform. The outcome depends on a combination of economic 
and political factors, some of which may not be apparent until crisis strikes. These 
factors include each country’s budget and political capacity (domestic and 
international), the value of the distressed bank’s assets in each jurisdiction, and the 
importance of its functions to each affected economy.
136
 
The cross-border resolution regime deals with this conundrum by harmonizing 
institutions, improving communications, and resolution planning.
137
 Loss-sharing among 
governments remains unmentionable and unmentioned. It is easy to see why: it is 
politically unpalatable and technically imponderable. Discussing public burden sharing 
would be seen as conceding defeat on public-private burden sharing, or bail-in. As it 
stands, loss-sharing can be negotiated through technocratic channels ex post 
134. Laeven & Valencia, supra note 9, at 6–7 (describing policy interventions banks currently take in 
times of systemic financial crisis). 
135. Hey, Germany: You Got a Bailout, Too, BLOOMBERG VIEW (May 23, 2012), http://www. 
bloombergview.com/articles/2012-05-23/merkel-should-know-her-country-has-been-bailed-out-too. The 
related debate about resolution of cross-border financial conglomerates is long on process and 
conspicuously short on concrete ways of ensuring equitable burden-sharing among governments backing 
their respective financial institutions. See generally, IMF, Resolution of Cross-Border Banks, supra note 
110; FSB, Key Attributes, supra note 16. 
136. In a more realistic scenario where operations in each country are conducted through separate legal 
entities, the resolution process might either consolidate all the assets and liabilities or isolate and sell the 
healthy business lines without putting them in resolution. Shareholders and creditors of the failing U.S. 
subsidiary and its holding company (presumably Icelandic in this case) would take the bulk of the losses. 
The success of such an approach would depend on the feasibility of disaggregating what had been an 
integrated transnational business and the willingness of each jurisdiction to let its residents suffer losses. Cf. 
Goodhart & Schoenmaker, supra note 114, at 143–44 (describing the contagion of financial crisis that 
spreads from one country to many others). 
137. See BCBS, Cross-Border Bank Resolution Group, supra note 74, at 22–43 (discussing 
“[r]ecommendations to address the challenges arising in the resolution of a cross-border bank”). 
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and ad hoc.
138
 The process is nontransparent and unaccountable, despite its huge 
distributional consequences.
139
 Whether the bulk of the loss falls on the debtors, 
creditors, or taxpayers of Iceland, France, Hungary, or the United States, the bargaining 
is equally invisible to those affected by it and to the markets. 
Now consider a thought experiment: each of the four jurisdictions involved in the 
hypothetical Icelandic bank holds a contingent equity stake in the institution in 
proportion to the bank’s activities in its jurisdiction. Iceland’s portion would be a 
function of the combined insured deposits and small-business loans, France’s would 
key off the combined deposits and loans to municipalities, Hungary’s off the consumer 
loans, and the United States’ off the value of the bond insurance exposure. Any one of 
the four governments would have the capacity to trigger the capital call; once it does, 
all four must participate.
140
 Any injection of public capital would come with pre-
agreed and preannounced unpleasant consequences for current management and 
shareholders, and perhaps even some creditors, though not depositors. 
In practice, such an agreement would not bring about automatic 
nationalization.
141
 In the first instance, it would create a powerful incentive for the 
bank to find private capital to avoid government takeover. Second, it would give 
each government a say in the bargaining outcome in proportion to its stake in the 
bank, as measured by its share in the bank’s gross assets and liabilities. This share 
may or may not reflect the bank’s importance to a given government. For example, 
if the Icelandic bank in the hypothetical is truly enormous, it may be responsible for 
half of all municipal lending in France—but that lending might form a relatively 
small part of the bank’s overall business. If France desperately wants to recapitalize 
the bank and keep it going, but Iceland would just as soon lose the French business, 
it might be willing to pay off France to avoid the firm-wide capital call. If the United 
States cares about the bond-insurance business, it might be willing to contribute 
capital. If not, it might try to buy its way out for less than the capital call liability. It 
is also possible that individual governments would simply refuse to comply with the 
call; however, it is more likely that they would try to bargain their way out to avoid 
the appearance of diplomatic confrontation. 
The objective of such a shared contingent public capital pool—Common 
Capital—is to make each government’s presumptive stake in the distressed bank and 
the outcome of its resolution as transparent as possible, and to create a default key to 
loss distribution.
142
 It creates a common currency, channeled through bank equity, in 
which the 
138. See generally Goodhart & Schoenmaker, supra note 114. 
139. See id. at 159–61 (acknowledging the difficulties in transparent communication and complexity of 
cross-border resolution). 
140. Compare to Basel III countercyclical charges process. See BCBS, Consultative Document: 
Countercyclical Capital Buffer Proposal, (July 2010) 
(This proposal implies there would be jurisdictional reciprocity . . . . [R]eciprocity does not 
entail any transfer of power between jurisdictions, in keeping with Basel Committee agreements 
more generally; the power to set and enforce the regime will ultimately rest with the home 
authority of the legal entity carrying the credit exposures.). 
141. Cf. Laeven & Valencia, supra note 9, at 30 (stating nationalization implies government has taken 
full control over a bank). 
142. See id. at 14–15 (detailing procedures for communicating information in time of crisis). 
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governments can bargain in the shadow of default, even where some authorities 
might prefer to use other crisis-management tools, such as regulatory forbearance.
143
 
This currency would be intelligible to the outside world, markets and citizens alike, 
who could monitor and demand explanations for any deviations from the default 
loss-allocation scenario.
144
 Importantly, this approach does not end the current 
technocratic negotiation, but prods it toward more openness and standardization. It 
should also create better incentives for governments to coordinate ex ante on 
monitoring the bank’s activities in their jurisdictions to determine their respective 
stakes in it and on the triggers and terms of public capital infusions, so as to 
maximize the bank’s incentives to raise private capital. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has framed the relationship between banks and governments as one 
of multiple unenforceable commitments to pay and to regulate, which effectively 
structure banks’ way of doing business. Knowing that government commitments are 
not strictly enforced, it makes sense for banks to configure themselves to take 
excessive risks, and to maximize the possibility of a bailout in crisis. The largest 
financial institutions—those that can credibly threaten governments with 
macroeconomic damage—have the incentive to configure their business to maximize 
the damage, and with it, their chances of favorable treatment (deregulation, subsidies, 
forbearance, bailouts). 
Bank-government negotiations get complicated in cross-border banking 
because governments must agree on the total magnitude of their exposure to bank 
failure, allocate it among themselves, and ensure that their respective regulatory 
regimes force banks to absorb the costs that would otherwise fall on the public. The 
challenge of getting all the valuation and allocation steps right in good times makes 
cross-border crisis management and bank resolution more difficult. While the 
prevailing approaches to cross-border resolution reform emphasize harmonization 
and coordination (all good things), the biggest challenge remains with burden-
sharing. 
Making government presence on the bank balance sheet explicit in the form of 
contingent public equity forces the distribution debate out into the open. It reflects the 
pervasive public presence on the bank balance sheet, now obscured in the bundle of 
implicit promises of liquidity support, insurance, distribution priority, and regulatory 
valuations. 
Where a bank balance sheet reflects the commitments of multiple 
governments, the contingent equity tranche should reflect their respective interests 
in a simple, politically intelligible way. The idea of Common Capital is to help 
structure negotiations between the bank and the governments that have a stake in its 
operations, and, importantly, among the governments. The goal in the first place is 
to create the strongest possible incentives for private recapitalization of an insolvent 
institution. Beyond this, the possibility of a shared public recapitalization should 
 
143. See id. at 20–21 (describing suggested communication practices among cross-border authorities). 
144. See FSB, Key Attributes, supra note 16, at 13–14 (stating that the treatment of creditors and 
ranking in insolvency should be transparent and disclosed to affected parties). 
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motivate governments to monitor banks’ activities in their respective jurisdictions and to 
confront burden-sharing challenges in a more structured and transparent way. 
In this Essay, I have deliberately characterized Common Capital as a thought 
experiment, rather than a practical policy proposal, for two reasons. First, an 
actionable proposal requires considerable technical elaboration beyond the scope of 
this Essay, accounting for the complexities of conglomerate structures including 
nonbank institutions. Second, default nationalization by multiple governments looks 
like a radical political proposition—even if the end result is unlikely to be the 
default. The thrust of this Essay has been to show that it is not nearly as radical as it 
seems at first blush. As a matter of fact, the idea of a pristinely private national bank 
is much further removed from reality. The fictions of private banks, complete bail -
in, and full home or host government responsibility, obscure constant high-stakes 
bargaining over distribution among debtors, creditors, and taxpayers in multiple 
jurisdictions. Such bargaining proceeds through a set of recurring trade-offs on bank 
balance sheets. Exposing the bargain to market and democratic scrutiny is likely to 
produce more efficient resolution, more equitable burden-sharing and, ultimately, 
safer banks. 
